

**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE
BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES**

APPLICANT(S): LIM, Seok-Hun

GROUP ART UNIT: 2174

APPLICATION NO.: 10/757,911

EXAMINER: MUHEBBULLAH, Sajeda

FILING DATE: January 14, 2004

DOCKET: 678-1156 (P10776)

DATE: February 18, 2009

**FOR: METHOD OF CHANGING SETTING OF USER SETTING MENU IN A
MOBILE TERMINAL**

Mail Stop Appeal Brief-Patents
Commissioner for Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

In response to the Examiner's Answer dated December 23, 2008 (the Examiner's Answer), Appellant respectfully submits that based on at least the arguments provided in the Appeal Brief of September 29, 2008 (the Appeal Brief), Claims 1-6 are patentable over U.S. Patent 6,990,333 to Andrew et al.

Claims 1-6 are pending in the Appeal. Claims 1 and 4 are in independent form. For the purposes of this Appeal, Claims 1-3 stand or fall together and Claims 4-6 stand or fall together.

The following comments are respectfully submitted in order to address statements made in the Examiner's Answer.

In the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner reiterated the rejection set forth in the Final Office Action mailed on December 27, 2007 (Final Office Action), and on pages 5 and 6, addressed certain of Appellant's arguments presented in the Appeal Brief.

Each of independent Claims 1 and 4 recite, in part, registering the user setting menu options selected by the user and changing the user setting menu options in the selected scheduling setting group...upon expiration of the timing value of the scheduling timer. The Examiner states that Andrew et al. clearly discloses a step of registering wherein a user may choose settings and registers them in a profile/group (col. 4, lines 58-65). (Examiner's Response, page 5).

MPEP §2131 Anticipation, clearly states that to anticipate a claim, the reference must teach every element of the claim. In addition, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently held “that unless a reference discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” Net Moneyin, Inc., v. Verisign, Inc., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21827 (CAFC 2008). Andrew et al. does not disclose within the four corners of the document all of the limitations claimed nor all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim. The Examiner has not met his initial burden of proof to establish a *prima facie* case for the §102(e) rejection.

Andrew et al., at column 4, lines 58-65, relates to the time periods for a timed profile, which may be a default setting set by a user or set prior to a purchase of the mobile phone (Step 306, FIG. 3), or instead of having a default period, a user may be prompted to enter a timed profile prior to activating the timed profile. Therefore, by citing this passage, the Examiner is comparing the time period of Andrew et al. to the registered “user setting menu options” of the present application.

However, independent Claims 1 and 4 further state that the user setting menu options are changed upon expiration of the timing value of the scheduling timer. The Examiner states that Andrew et al. teaches this limitation at column 7, lines 55-67). However, this passage states relates to a device returning to a previous profile whenever a timed profile is no longer active. However, Andrew et al. does not state that returning to a previous profile involves changing the default period. It is noted that Andrew et al. further discloses a period time that may be adjusted (FIG. 4, Step 410),

but that the Examiner asserts that the “period time” corresponds to the timing value of the scheduling timer of the present application. (Final Office Action, page 4). Therefore, the “period time” of Andrew et al. cannot correspond to the “user setting menu options” of the present application, as all of the limitations of the prior art reference must be arranged or combined in the same way as the recited claims. Therefore, Andrew et al. does not teach all of the limitations of Claims 1 and 4.

Appellant respectfully submits that the Examiner has erred in rejecting Claims 1 and 4, and that these claims are not anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) by Andrew et al.

While not conceding the patentability of the dependent claims, *per se*, Claims 2-3 and 5-6 are also allowable for at least the above reasons.

CONCLUSION

Based on at least the foregoing, and as the Examiner has failed to make out a *prima facie* case for an anticipation rejection, the rejections of Claims 1 and 4 must be reversed.

Accordingly, independent Claims 1 and 4 are not anticipated by Andrew et al.

Dependent Claims 2-3 and 5-6 are also not anticipated by Andrew et al., for at least the above reasons.

Dated: February 18, 2009

By:



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19. As a result of defendants' actions, plaintiff experienced pain and physical injuries to her wrists and body, emotional distress, fear, embarrassment, humiliation, discomfort, loss of liberty, damage to reputation, and loss of her house keys.

**FEDERAL CLAIMS AGAINST POLICE
OFFICER VICENTE FERNANDEZ AND
POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOES 1-3**

20. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in ¶¶ 1-19 as if fully set forth herein.

21. The conduct of Police Officer Vicente and Police Officers John Does 1-3, as described herein, amounted to an illegal entry and search of plaintiff's home, false arrest, excessive force, and fabrication of evidence. This conduct violated plaintiff's rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

**STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST POLICE
OFFICER VICENTE FERNANDEZ AND
POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOES 1-3**

22. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in ¶¶ 1-21 as if fully set forth herein.

23. The conduct of Police Officer Vicente and Police Officers John Does 1-3, as described herein, amounted to false arrest, assault, battery, trespass, and negligence in violation of the laws of the State of New York.

**FEDERAL CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY OF
NEW YORK**

24. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in ¶¶ 1-23 as if fully set forth herein.

25. The City of New York directly caused the constitutional violations suffered by plaintiff.

26. Upon information and belief, the City of New York, at all relevant times herein, was aware from notices of claim, lawsuits, complaints filed with the City, and from the City's own observations, that its police officers, including the individual defendants, are unfit, ill-tempered officers who have the propensity to commit the acts alleged herein. Nevertheless, the City of New York exercised deliberate indifference by failing to take remedial action. The City failed to properly train, retrain, supervise, discipline, and monitor the officers and improperly retained and utilized them. Moreover, the City of New York failed to adequately investigate prior complaints against the officers.

27. The aforesaid conduct by the City of New York violated plaintiff's rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

**STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY
OF NEW YORK**

28. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in ¶¶ 1-27 as if fully set forth herein.

29. Because the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their employment as members of the NYPD during the incident in question, the City of New York is vicariously liable under state law for the false arrest, assault, battery, trespass, and negligence committed by the officers.

30. Further, the City of New York is liable under state law because it negligently hired, trained, supervised, and retained the individual defendants.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands a jury trial and the following relief jointly and severally against the defendants:

- a. Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by a jury;
- b. Punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury;
- c. Costs, interest and attorney's fees;
- d. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper,

including injunctive and declaratory relief.

DATED: June 14, 2007
Brooklyn, New York

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By:

s/

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